

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5430

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01575

CW MESSAGE NO. 22

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM US UR

SUBJECT: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND

SEVEN: FIFTH DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1978

1. SUMMARY: AT THE JANUARY 30, 1978, DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, USDEL RESPONDED TO EARLIER SOVDEL QUESTION ON QUANTITIES OF PROHIBITED CHEMICALS TO BE PRODUCED OR DIVERTED. USDEL ASKED FOR SOVIET REACTIONS TO U.S. PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH IRRITANTS AND FOR LISTS OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS AND "IMPORTANT" LETHAL AND OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS. IT ALSO ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS DEALING WITH SOVIET TERMINOLOGY AND DETAILS OF SOVIET POSITION ON DECLARATIONS CONCERNING DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND ELIMINATION/DISMANTLING OF FACILITIES. SOVDEL RESPONDED TO U.S. QUESTIONS. END SUMMARY.

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2. THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DRAFTING GROUP WAS HELD MONDAY AFTERNOON, JANUARY 30, AT THE SOVIET MISSION.

3. THE U.S EXPERTS RESPONDED TO AN EARLIER SOVIET QUESTION AS TO "WHO, AND WHEN, SHALL ESTABLISH THE QUANTITIES OF OTHERWISE PROHIBITED CHEMICALS TO BE PRODUCED FOR NON-

HOSTILE PURPOSES," INDICATING THERE WOULD BE NO CEILINGS ON QUANTITIES OF CHEMICALS PRODUCED OR DIVERTED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES. THE U.S. EXPERTS ADDED THAT THE U.S. HAS, HOWEVER, PROPOSED THAT QUANTITIES OF LETHAL OR OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS PRODUCED OR DIVERTED FOR NON-HOSTILE MILITARY PURPOSES BE SUBJECT TO A GENERAL CEILING. TO HELP CLARIFY THE U.S. POSITION, THE U.S. EXPERTS ALSO PASSED A CHART TO THE SOVIET EXPERTS SHOWING HOW DIFFERENT TYPES OF CHEMICALS WOULD BE AFFECTED. THE U.S. EXPERTS THEN ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE SOVIET POSITION. THE EXCHANGES ARE SUMMARIZED IN PARA 3-9 BELOW.

4. IRRITANTS. ACTING US ALTERNATE REP (AKALOVSKY) SOUGHT SOVIET REACTION TO THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE U.S FOR DEALING WITH IRRITANTS. SOVIET EXPERT SOKOLSKY REPLIED THAT THE SOVDEL HAS QUESTIONS OF THEIR OWN ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON IRRITANTS AND WILL DEFER COMMENTING ON THAT PROPOSAL UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET THEIR QUESTIONS ANSWERED.

5. LISTS OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS AND "IMPORTANT" LETHAL AND OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS. AKALOVSKY ASKED FOR SOVDEL REACTION TO THE U.S. PRESENTATION ON LISTS OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS AND "IMPORTANT" LETHAL AND OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS. SOVIET DEPUTY REP KRASSULIN
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REPLIED THAT THEY WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE U.S. PROPOSAL WHICH THEY HAD ALSO SENT TO MOSCOW, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT YET READY TO RESPOND TO IT.

6. TERMINOLOGY. AKALOVSKY AND U.S. EXPERTS BAY, MIKULAK AND LEONARD ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS DEALING WITH TERMINOLOGY USED IN THE REVISED SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION.

A. WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE I, PARA B, AND ARTICLE VII, SOVIET EXPERTS INDICATED THAT RUSSIAN WORD USED, "PREDNAZNACHEN", COULD MEAN EITHER "DESIGNED" OR "DESIGNATED": IT IS USED, HOWEVER, IN THEIR DRAFT CONVENTION TO MEAN "DESIGNED" FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES ONLY, "FOR NOTHING ELSE." (I.E., THE DESIGN HAS BEEN WORKED OUT SPECIFICALLY WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE PURPOSES IN MIND). THE SUBJECT OF AIRCRAFT SPRAY DEVICES DESIGNED "SPECIALLY" BUT NOT "EXCLUSIVELY" FOR CW WAS BROUGHT UP IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS CONVERSATION. BOTH DELS AGREED THAT THIS DISTINCTION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AGAIN AT A LATER DATE.

B. WHEN QUESTIONED (PER STATE 22412) ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "PEACEFUL" AND "NONHOSTILE", THE SOVIET EXPERTS

RESPONDED THAT AS THEY USE THE TERMS, "NONHOSTILE" IS THE
BROADER TERM; IT INCLUDES PERMITTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(FOR EXAMPLE, PROTECTIVE TRAINING). (COMMENT: TERM
"NONHOSTILE" WAS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY U.S. DEL. IT WAS
CONSIDERED MORE PRECISE THAN TERM "PEACEFUL" AS USED IN THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, BUT WAS INTENDED TO COVER
SAME ACTIVITIES. JUDGING FROM SOVIET RESPONSE, THEY APPEAR
TO UNDERSTAND TERMS IN CW CONTEXT IN SAME WAY AS U.S. DEL.
END COMMENT).

C. THE SOVIETS WERE QUERIED ABOUT THE PRECISE MEANING OF
THE TERM "PORYADOK" AS USED BY SOV AMB LIKHATCHEV IN HIS
JANUARY 25 STATEMENT ("THAT EACH STATE PARTY SHOULD DECLARE
WHETHER IT HAS INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF
MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND, IF SO, SHOULD DECLARE THE
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"PORYADOK" FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING). IN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5431

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 01575

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ENGLISH THIS TERM CAN MEAN EITHER "PROCEDURES FOR" OR

"SEQUENCE OF". KRASSULIN INDICATED THAT THE TERM MEANT PROCEDURES FOR DESTRUCTION/DISMANTLING AS WELL AS TIME FRAMES.

D. WHEN ASKED WHY THE SOVIETS HAD MENTIONED THE ENMOD CONVENTION IN THEIR DRAFT ARTICLE XVIII SINCE IT WOULD NOT SEEM DIRECTLY RELATED TO A CW CONVENTION, KRASSULIN SAID IT WAS BECAUSE SOME CHEMICALS COULD BE USED TO AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT.

E. USDEL ASKED WHETHER THE USE OF THE TERM "PROPHYLACTIC" IN ARTICLE I, PARA A, WAS INTENDED IN THE SAME WAY THIS TERM IS USED IN THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONVENTION. SOVIET EXPERT SOKOLSKY RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT ON THE BASIS OF LABORATORY TESTS WITH ANIMALS, "CHEMICAL AGENTS CAN BE USED TO MAKE A HIGH-MOLECULAR-CONFIDENTIAL

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WEIGHT ANTIGEN WHICH, WHEN INJECTED, CAN CREATE A LOW-ORDER RESISTANCE."

7. DECLARATIONS DEALING WITH DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND ELIMINATION/DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES. BAY ASKED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILS ON THEIR PROPOSED (IN ARTICLE XIII) "PERIODIC DECLARATIONS AND NOTIFICATIONS REGARDING PROGRESS OF THE DESTRUCTION OR DIVERSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF DECLARED VOLUMES OF ACCUMULATED STOCKS ..., BRACKET AND BRACKET ELIMINATION OR DISMANTLING OF INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER CAPABILITIES. ...". KRASSULIN EXPLAINED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE ANY DETAILS TO PROVIDE AT THIS TIME AND MATTER COULD BE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION. (THIS IS A US IDEA THE SOVIETS HAVE PICKED UP; USDEL IMPRESSION WAS THAT EITHER THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT REALLY THOUGHT THIS MATTER THROUGH OR THEY ARE WAITING FOR A U.S. PROPOSAL HERE, OR BOTH).

8. FACT-FINDING AND INVESTIGATIONS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MIKULAK ASKED WHETHER FACT-FINDING CONDUCTED AT THE REQUEST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (ANNEX II, PARA 3) WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL INVESTIGATION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE XVI, PARA 2. KRASSULIN INDICATED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, TWO DISTINCT PROCEDURES WERE MEANT. THE FIRST PROCEDURE WOULD BE FACT-FINDING AND THE SECOND, A FULL INVESTIGATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

9. COMPOSITION OF CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT. MIKULAK ASKED WHETHER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT (ANNEX II, PARA 8) WOULD BE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS OR SPOKESMEN FOR THEIR HOME COUNTRIES, SINCE THE TEXT REFERS TO THEM AS "REPRESENTATIVES". KRASSULIN ANSWERED THAT "WE HAVEN'T

THOUGHT THAT FAR".

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10. TYPES OF FACILITIES TO BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED OR DISMANTLED. LEONARD HANDED THE SOVIETS A LIST OF HYPOTHETICAL TYPES OF CHEMICAL FACILITIES AND ASKED THE SOVIETS TO INDICATE, AT A FUTURE MEETING, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DECLARED AND WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED/DISMANTLED UNDER THEIR DRAFT CONVENTION. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD RESPOND TO THIS QUESTION AT A FUTURE MEETING OF THE DRAFTING GROUP.

11. THE DATE FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS LEFT OPEN, TO BE DETERMINED AT THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 1 FEBRUARY. SORENSON

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